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Computer improvisers produce 'virtual sociality' that reveals as much about human interaction as about machines

George Lewis argues that building interactive computational systems with degrees of autonomy and nonrepeatability produces ‘a kind of virtual sociality that both draws from and challenges traditional notions of human interactivity.’ His conclusion is that what we learn from machine improvisation is more about people and their environment than about machines per se. Interactive systems enact a ‘posthumanist’ social aesthetic where the boundary between human and machine agent is productively blurred. This links algorithmic music to broader traditions of free improvisation and to political discourses about agency and self-determination.

Examples

Lewis’s Voyager system (1984–) responds to live instrumentalists in real time. A performance with Voyager is not a demonstration of machine intelligence but a social-aesthetic event revealing how humans construct musical dialogue.

Assessment

Lewis says that what we learn from computer improvisation is more about people than machines. Explain what he means, and give one example of a specific human musical behavior or assumption that computer improvisation might reveal or challenge.

“Interactions with these systems in musical performance produce a kind of virtual sociality that both draws from and challenges traditional notions of human interactivity and sociality”
corpus · the-oxford-handbook-of-algorithmic-music-mclean-and-dean-eds · chunk 55